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Abstract
This paper examines the implications for African economies of the possible outcomes from the ongoing 
agriculture negotiations in the Doha Round. The paper defines scenarios that capture key elements of the 
modalities negotiations and undertakes simulations using a global dynamic general equilibrium model to 
examine the impact of multilateral agricultural trade reforms on African economies. The scenarios vary 
in their level of ambition in the market access pillar through both the level of tariff cuts in the different 
tiers and the level of sensitive sectors defined both for developed and developing economies. Results show 
that ambitious coefficients in the market access pillar remain the best outcome for Africa. Even what 
might seem to be an insignificant definition of sensitive products for developed countries erodes potential 
benefits from deep tariff cuts for African countries. This suggests that utilizing sensitive products tariff lines 
by developed countries not only dampens the expected positive outcomes for agriculture negotiations in 
favour of Africa but could also actually wipe out such gains. The results further confirm findings of other 
studies showing that tariff cuts for agricultural goods yield higher gains than elimination of subsidies, and 
this applies mainly to net food importing developing countries. Thus, reduction of subsidies should go 
hand-in-hand with agricultural tariff reductions in order to ensure win-win outcomes. 
JEL Codes: Q17, D6, C68, N57
Key words: Agriculture in International Trade, Welfare Economics, Computable General Equilibrium 
Models, Africa.
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I.     INTRODUCTION
The question of market access is of crucial importance for Africa.  African countries have continued to put 
emphasis on this question since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which 
African countries are playing an increasingly dynamic role.  The question of market access is especially 
crucial for their development agenda, this is attributable to the restricted nature of African markets and 
to the need for the continent to open up to export markets in order to support growth dynamics and 
efforts to diversify production structures. 
Since negotiations began under the Doha Round, African countries have sought to lay down an ambitious 
reform agenda, particularly in the agricultural sector, which remains highly protected. Tariffs applied 
to agricultural imports by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries are too high on average.  There is also wide dispersion in tariff levels, and a significant number 
of tariff peaks are applied to some of the more highly protected products.
For several reasons, agriculture is very important to developing countries and to Africa in particular. 
First, it represents the main source of employment, accounting for nearly 70 per cent of the total in the 
least developed countries (LDCs), 30 per cent in the middle-income countries and just 3 per cent in 
the developed countries.1  In addition to employment, agriculture continues to play a key role in most 
of these countries economic growth profiles.  Consequently, the cultivation of subsistence crops helps 
provide food and ensures food security for the people.  At the same time, export crops account for a 
sizeable proportion of export revenues in many African countries. Finally, agriculture plays a crucial role 
in poverty reduction strategies because the majority of poor people live in the rural areas.
These reasons generally explain the importance given to the agricultural sector by African countries in 
the context of international trade negotiations.  Improving the current conditions of the international 
markets in agricultural products and giving more attention to their concerns could lead to a better 
integration of their economies in the global market place and promote economic growth.
The objective of this article is to assist African countries in formulating concrete proposals in relation to 
market access for agricultural products. Accordingly, an effort will be made to identify the most appropriate 
formulas for African economies that would allow for greater liberalization of OECD markets while at 
the same time providing African countries with the means to sustain their agricultural development and 
ensure their food security.
1  Several studies show the importance of the agricultural sector in developing countries and in Africa. See, for example: 
- FAO, Agriculture towards 2015, Rome 2000.
- OECD, Agricultural policy reform: Development and prospects, Paris 2000.
2After this introduction, main factors at play in agricultural development in Africa will be described.  The 
third section highlights the specificities of market access in agriculture.  The fourth section, reviews the 
studies that have been undertaken on the subject.  The fifth section, describes the model used in this 
study, followed by a discussion of the various scenarios adopted.  The seventh section is a discussion of 
the results obtained.  The main conclusions of the study are presented in the last section.
II. PROFILE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA
Soon after attaining independence, African countries gave primacy to agriculture in their development 
strategies.  Thus, from the late 1960s and during the 1970s, most of them sought to put in place new 
agricultural policies and to embark on their green revolution.  It should be noted that, for the most 
part, the colonial policies had favoured export crops at the expense of subsistence crops.   The focus of 
agricultural modernization in Africa was thus on increasing agricultural productivity and ensuring food 
security. 
Agriculture modernization required a high level of public investment, and particularly in institutional 
structures with the establishment of a considerable number of enterprises specializing in rural development, 
rural infrastructure, support for agricultural research and the promotion of new agricultural technologies, 
and the provision of low-cost financing, seeds and fertilizers to rural communities.  The modernization of 
agriculture was considered a necessary and essential prerequisite to Africa’s economic take-off.  Increased 
agricultural productivity was to lead to better incomes for peasants and consequently expand the rather 
restricted markets of these countries.  In addition, agricultural development was to provide a market for 
the chemical industries and for intermediate and capital goods. Higher yields from agriculture would 
provide the necessary inputs for the production of foodstuffs and for all activities relating to the first-stage 
transformation of agricultural products.  The modernization of agriculture was thus viewed as an absolute 
necessity in development strategies because of its effects on the rest of the economy.  Governments had 
taken care of most of the financing necessary for such modernization.  The improvement in the prices of 
raw materials exported by these countries in the 1970s enabled them to sustain these policies.
However, the early 1980s witnessed a wind of change.  First, from the point of view of ideology, there was 
a paradigm shift with an upheaval of the Keynesian economics theories that had dominated economic 
thinking and development policy stances since the end of the Second World War.  A new intellectual 
context was gaining ground, in which the market became the prime mover in the economic sphere. 
This consensus called into question state interventionism in so far as it created price distortions that 
were at the root of the imbalances of developed and developing economies.  Furthermore, the early 
1980s was also characterized by the debt crisis which beset most African countries.  This debt crisis led 
to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes aimed at reducing domestic and external deficits. 
Restoring equilibrium required the State to disengage from economic activities and to allow the market 
a more prominent role in the economic sphere.  In the agricultural sector in particular, the new policies 
adopted in the 1980s were characterized by a far-reaching review of such interventionism and a move 
to try out the capacity of private stakeholders to assume responsibility for and guarantee the revival of 
agricultural production. 
Some years down the line, it had to be acknowledged that these new choices in agricultural development 
have not yielded the desired effects.  Instead, there was a sharp increase in food deficits in many African 
countries.  In 1997, the world trade in agricultural products increased four fold by reference to the late 
1970s, reaching a global value of nearly $US460 billion.2 The position of developing countries in world 
trade worsened, with their share of global imports increasing from 28 per cent in 1974 to 37 per cent 
in 1997 accompanied by a slight increase in exports, which rose from 30 to 34 per cent of the total over 
the same period.  These developments led to a rapid deterioration in these countries’ balance of trade 
in food products, with a deficit of nearly $US13 billion in 1997.  At the same time, there was a sharp 
drop in food aid to net importing countries.  LDCs were particularly hard hit and food insecurity rose 
markedly in these countries.  Their exports decreased considerably while their food imports accounted 
for an increasingly significant share of their trade balances, reaching in some cases nearly 20 per cent of 
the total.3  Developing countries thus began to witness a severe agricultural crisis and food crisis during 
the 1980s and 1990s.
While African countries were significantly reducing their support and all forms of subsidies for their 
rural communities, this was mostly increasing in the developed countries.  It is estimated that the OECD 
countries granted almost $US370 million to their farmers in 1997, which represents more than six times 
the amount going to development aid.4  The subsidies continued to increase thereafter, even though 
official figures show a decrease over the last few years. This increase has benefited all aspects of agricultural 
production in these countries.  It is estimated that agricultural support has increased by 28 per cent in 
the OECD countries since 1997.5  Half of these subsidies are from European Union countries, and 
Japan accounts for nearly 39 per cent.  Support to farmers is not limited to these countries. United States 
farmers received nearly $US28 billion in subsidies in 2000, and the new US Farm Bill of 2002 commits 
the US Government to granting $US 180 billion in subsidies over a ten-year period.
All these factors reveal the skewed and unbalanced nature of the world markets in agricultural products. 
Over and above the production differential, which is in their favour, developed countries have consistently 
increased the support extended to their large-scale farmers.  The situation has entailed adverse consequences 
not only for the agricultural exports of African countries but also for their production and consequently, 
their food security.  These developments explain the importance attached by these countries to agriculture 
negotiations.
2  See FAO, Agriculture, trade and food security: Issues and options in the forthcoming WTO negotiations from the perspectives of developing 
countries, Rome 1999.
3  See, for example:
- UNCTAD, Trade and development report 2002, Geneva 2002;
- UNCTAD, The least developed countries report 2001 and 2002, Geneva 2001 and 2002.
4  See UNDP, Human development report 2002, New York 2002.
5  See UNDP, Mettre le commerce international au service de tous, New York 2003.
There is now a renewed awareness within the international community as to the role of agriculture in 
poverty reduction.  The majority of people (more than 75 per cent) living on less than $US1 a day live 
in the rural areas in which agriculture is the main economic activity and the main source of income. 
Strengthening agricultural competitiveness is now at the top of the agenda for the African countries in 
their poverty reduction strategy.  Market access issues are therefore of the utmost importance in terms of 
their impact on the competitiveness of both domestic as well as external African agricultural markets.
6III. MARKET ACCESS AND AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Agriculture is the catalyst for the economy and contributes to the livelihoods of the majority of the 
population (between 40 and 90 per cent according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
in 2004). Furthermore, the majority of the population lives in rural areas where malnutrition is on 
the rise.  In this context, the results of the agriculture negotiations are of crucial importance to these 
countries because the improvement of this sector is one of the main ways of bringing about poverty 
reduction.  Market access, though not enough in itself, is a necessary condition for agricultural and rural 
development in Africa.  There are other constraints that have an adverse effect on rural development in 
Africa, such as rural infrastructures and mechanisms of agricultural financing.  In contrast to the trade 
in non-agricultural goods, the variation in global prices is far too susceptible to external factors such as 
the level of harvests in the main producer countries and the trend of the shift in demand structure.  The 
impact of the climate in the industrialized countries wheat prices, for instance, is well known, as is the 
effect of growth and changing food consumption patterns in China followed the economic progress in 
that country.
For most agricultural products, however, market access is a major constraint that restricts rural development 
in Africa.  Both market access conditions “border measures” and domestic support measures such as export 
subsidies vitiate the capacity of African countries to develop their agricultural sectors.  The potential to 
develop a competitive production capacity in Africa is eroded by these measures, and particularly for 
“temperate” agricultural commodities such as maize, wheat, meat, sugar, rice and some vegetables and 
fruit.6   Most African countries have the potential to produce at least some of these products.  Trade in 
these products is greatly distorted by the agricultural policies of the developed countries, both in terms of 
border measures (tariffs, quotas, non-tariff measures) and support for exports as well as domestic support. 
According to OECD estimates, protection of markets at border points (tariffs and quotas) represents, 
on average less than 50 per cent of the total support granted to farmers in the OECD countries.7  These 
measures have the effect of reducing the international competitiveness of African producers and of closing 
the doors to their access to developed countries’ markets, especially because they have a negative effect on 
international prices.  The reduced competitiveness partly explains the fact that Africa has become a net 
importer of agricultural goods since the 1980s.
6  On the other hand, Africa often enjoys favourable tariffs in terms of market access for “tropical” products, with the notable exception of 
cotton and, to a lesser extent, tobacco. 
7  See “Domestic support: economics and policy instruments”, in Agriculture and the WTO”, Harry de Gorter, Merlinda D. Ingco and Laura 
Ignacio, 2004.
This trend is a major source of concern in terms of food security. According to FAO (2004), the three most 
important agricultural products in Africa are wheat, maize and rice, which are three basic cereals that are 
essential for food security.  Africa is also a huge importer of sugar, oils, poultry and milk products, which 
are commodities that are essential for food security in the continent and which Africa has considerable 
potential to produce.  They are also commodities that benefit from heavy subsidies and from a high level 
of protection on the part of developed countries. 
While the markets of industrial products have been subject to significant reductions, the markets of 
agricultural products have continued to benefit from a high level of protection, especially in the developed 
countries. The average level of customs duties for agricultural products thus dropped from 40 to 4 per 
cent between 1945 and 1995, while the average level for agricultural products was still in the region of 62 
per cent.8 However, these levels are even higher for so-called sensitive or strategic products in the OECD 
countries, such as wheat (214 per cent), barley (197 per cent) and maize (154 per cent). The negotiations 
under the Uruguay Round have sought to reduce this level of protection by converting all non-tariff 
barriers into tariff barriers and by reducing tariff barriers. However, African countries believe that these 
reductions are still too low and continue to represent significant barriers to the international market 
access of their exports. In spite of the commitment to reduce them, some duties on sensitive products 
have in fact considerably increased over the past few years.
African countries also raise the question of the tariff peaks and the tariff escalation that are applied by 
most of the OECD countries. This phenomenon particularly affects these countries because it is applied 
to a high proportion of their exports. It is calculated that at present more than half the tariff peaks 
are applied to agricultural products, agro-processing products and fishery products.9 These tariff peaks 
sometimes exceed 100 per cent. For some products these peaks are even more elevated with nearly 180 
per cent for bananas in the case of European Union countries, 550 per cent for groundnuts for Japan 
and 132 per cent for the United States of America. For other products such as sugar, rice, meat, milk 
products, vegetables and fish, the tariffs applied by the OECD countries are even higher, in the range of 
600-900 per cent.
In addition to tariff peaks, African countries have to grapple with escalation.  This phenomenon also 
creates difficulties for countries that are trying to avoid an international integration that is based on 
raw materials and are intent on diversifying their production structures through the transformation of 
their agricultural activities.  Tariff escalation means that, the share of processed goods in the exports of 
the developing countries is still low, at below 5 per cent of the exports of food products from the LDCs 
and just 17 per cent of the total exports of the developing countries.  Tariff escalation is applied by the 
8  See UNPD (2003), op. cit.
9  See WTO and UNCTAD, The post-Uruguay Round tariff environment for developing countries: tariff peaks and tariff escalation, Geneva 
1999.
OECD countries to products such as coffee, cocoa, oil seeds, fruit and vegetables.10  In spite of their 
commitments to limiting tariff escalation, the levels of protection for first-stage processing products is 
still too high and currently stands at approximately 44 per cent for flour, 25 per cent for orange juice in 
the case of European Union countries, 30 per cent for refined sugar in the case of Japan and 42 per cent 
for milk in the case of United States of America. 
Tariff protection levels in developed countries remain high, despite their commitment to reducing 
them under the Uruguay Round, and contrast with the levels of protection in African countries. Since 
the mid-1980s, African countries have undertaken important reforms within the framework of the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in order to eliminate non-tariff protection and reduce tariffs. 
Furthermore, export subsidies and domestic support measures depreciate the prices of agricultural 
commodities. These measures are mainly enforced by developed countries and mostly have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of African countries in the agricultural sector – for domestic markets as 
well as exports.    It is in this context that African countries are demanding greater market access for their 
agricultural and first-stage processing products within the framework of the international negotiations. 
Improving market access involves a significant reduction in customs tariffs and a drop in exports subsidies 
and domestic support measures that have a negative impact on trade.
10  See Shirotori Miho, Notes on the implementation of the agreement on agriculture, UNCTAD, Geneva 2000.
IV.   A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This section analyses the impact of the various scenarios of agricultural trade liberalization. The models 
that are the most favourable as well as the most probable for Africa are highlighted. First, we will analyse 
the impact of the different scenarios on sub-Saharan Africa; second, we will examine the results of the 
simulations on North Africa. 11
4.1	 The	impact	on	sub-Saharan	Africa
Our review of the literature indicates that for sub-Saharan Africa, the level of exports increases in line with 
the importance of the level of liberalization.  The greater the level of liberalization, the more significant 
the increase in exports.  This also applies to the economic welfare indicators, which increase in line with 
the level of liberalization.  Moreover, these studies testify to the fact that exports increase with special and 
differential (S&D) treatment.
Similarly, studies show that the level of imports undergoes a similar development, though this is less than 
that of exports with S&D treatment.  On the other hand, projections that do not take into account this 
S&D treatment (ECA 2004) show that for sub-Saharan Africa imports tend to increase more rapidly 
than exports when liberalization is more ambitious.  Such a scenario would thus imply a worsening of 
the agricultural trade deficit of sub-Saharan Africa and thus greater dependence as well as deterioration 
in the external debt situation in the absence of S&D treatment.
In fact, it seems that the more ambitious scenarios offer better prospects for African countries. These 
results surely explain the position of these countries during multilateral negotiations and the fact that 
they opt for substantial reforms in the agricultural sector.
4.2	 The	impact	on	North	Africa
Our review of the literature emphasizes that North Africa will benefit from agricultural trade liberalization 
even in the case of modest reform scenarios. Liberalization scenarios of agricultural market access seem 
to have a relatively more significant impact on North Africa than on sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike sub-
Saharan Africa, North Africa seems to gain in terms of national revenue and welfare, even in the case of 
a limited opening-up of market access, as demonstrated by the scenarios of “modest” and “little” reforms 
put forward by ECA (2004).  In the case of reciprocal liberalization (without S&D treatment), North 
11  A more comprehensive overview of the literature may be found in: “Exclure l’Afrique des marchés? Evaluation de l’accès aux marchés pour 
les pays africains”, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, forthcoming, 2004.
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Africa would be the second largest beneficiary in terms of welfare (after Oceania).  This is without doubt, 
due to the impact of the drop in prices on the consumer’s surplus. 
The simulations also tend to show that North Africa would see its agricultural trade rise sharply in the 
case of significant liberalization.  In terms of welfare, any reform that so much as eliminates exports 
subsidies will affect North Africa more adversely than sub-Saharan Africa. The world regions that would 
be most affected by this type of reform are precisely North Africa and the Middle East.  This can be clearly 
explained by the marked dependence of North Africa on imports of food products.
4.3	 What	lessons	can	be	learnt	in	terms	of	trade	policy?
The analysis of the different scenarios tends to show that Governments of the African countries could 
be forced to choose between giving greater importance to tariff revenues on the one hand – which 
would amount to protecting local producers in the face of a rise in imports – and on the other, giving 
greater importance to the consumer’s surplus.   In fact, projections show that significant liberalization is 
favourable to the consumer’s surplus but unfavourable in terms of tariff revenues.  Significant and rapid 
liberalization could also prejudice some local producers that are less competitive than the international 
competition. Limited liberalization and S&D treatment, as already noted, seem to lead to a more limited 
decrease in tariff revenues and less rapid increase in imports.  On the other hand, an increased opening-
up seems to have a more positive result in terms of welfare and also seems to have a (less evident) positive 
impact on the level of exports. 
What emerges from this review of the literature is that an improvement in sub-Saharan Africa’s trade 
position in agricultural products can only flow from ambitious scenarios that, as such, are capable 
of realizing the pro-development commitments made by WTO members at the Doha Conference. 
Moreover, these studies show that if ambitious scenarios bring significant benefits to North Africa, then 
the subregion can also benefit in the case of more modest scenarios.
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Table	1:	Results	of	the	simulations	on	agriculture	–	North	Africa
1Formulas Scenario/ Studies 2Welfare 3GDP 4Exports 5Imports Tariff revenues
Linear “little reform”, Ben 
Hammouda and 
Osakwe, ECA 200
+ $US 
million (*) 0.0% (#) - - -
“modest reform”, 
Ben Hammouda 
and Osakwe, ECA 
200
+ $US 
million (*) 0.% (#) - - -
Linear with 
elimination of tariff 
peaks and S&D 
treatment
“Harbinson”, Peters 
and Vanzetti, 
UNCTAD 200
$US 00 
million for the 
deeloping 
countries
- % for 
deeloping 
countries
- -% for deeloping 
countries
Linear with S&D 
treatment
“Conseratie 
scenario”, Peters 
and Vanzetti, 
UNCTAD 200
Target: $US 
2 million for 
the deeloping 
countries
-
0% for 
deeloping 
countries
-
Non aailable for 
North Africa but 
% for deeloping 
countries
Linear + tariff 
harmonization + 
S&D treatment
“Cancun”, or 
blended formula, 
Peters and 
Vanzetti, UNCTAD 
200
$US 6 
million for the 
deeloping 
countries
-
% for 
deeloping 
countries
-
% for 
deeloping 
countries
Total liberalization “full liberalization”, 
Ben Hammouda 
and Osakwe, ECA 
200
+ $US  
million (*) 0.% (#) - - -
Non-linear (USA) “Ambitious”, Peters 
and Vancetti, 
UNCTAD 200
$US 2 for 
the deeloping 
countries
- 2% for 
deeloping 
countries
- - 6% for 
deeloping 
countries
(*) Impact on the change in market access of products excluding the impact caused by the change resulting from domestic 
measures.
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Table	2:	Results	of	the	simulations	on	agriculture	–	sub-Saharan	Africa
6Formulas Scenario/ Studies 7Welfare 8GDP 9Exports 10Imports Tariff 
revenues
Linear “little reform”, Ben 
Hammouda and 
Osakwe, ECA 
200
- $US 6 
million (*) - 0.% (#) - - -
“modest reform”, 
Ben Hammouda 
and Osakwe, ECA 
200
- $US  
million (*)
- 0.2% (#)
- - -
Linear with 
elimination of tariff 
peaks and S&D 
treatment
“Harbinson”, 
Peters and 
Vanzetti, UNCTAD 
200
$US 00 
million for 
deeloping 
countries - $US 
 million for 
LDCs
- + % for 
deeloping 
countries and 
0% for LDCs
- - % for 
deeloping 
countries, + 
2% for LDCs
Linear with S&D 
treatment
“Conservative 
scenario”, Peters 
and Vanzetti, 
UNCTAD 200
$US 2 
million for 
deeloping 
countries; - 
$US  million 
for LDCs
-
Non aailable 
for North Africa 
but 0% for 
deeloping 
countries, 2% 
for LDCs
-
Non aailable 
for North 
Africa but % 
for deeloping 
countries, 
+% for LDCs
Linear + tariff 
harmonization
“Cancun”, or 
blended formula, 
Peters and 
Vanzetti, UNCTAD 
200
$US 6 
million for 
deeloping 
countries; $US 
 million for 
LDCs
-
+ % for 
deeloping 
countries and + 
22% for LDCs
-
- % for 
deeloping 
countries and 
% for LDCs
Total liberalization “full liberalization”, 
Ben Hammouda 
and Osakwe, ECA 
200
+ $US 26 
million (*) 0.% (#) - - -
Non-linear (USA) “Ambitious”, 
Peters and 
Vanzetti, UNCTAD 
200
+ $US 2 
million for 
deeloping 
countries; + 
$US 0 
million for 
LDCs
- 2% for 
deeloping 
countries, % 
for LDCs
-
- 6% for 
deeloping 
countries, - 
0% for LDCs
Source: Table drawn up by the authors.
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V.   THE MODEL 
The model used in this study is a simplified version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model 
(Hertel (1997)).12  This multi-regional and static general equilibrium model functions by assuming that 
there is perfect competition and constant returns to scale.  It reflects bilateral trade patterns, international 
transport profit margins and the protection rates for imports by country and by sector. The GTAP model 
also enables the calculation of trends in production, consumption, trade and economic welfare caused 
by external shocks, especially those linked to trade, such as the shifts in transaction costs.  The version 
used in this study is based on Tom Rutherford’s GTAP in the General Algebraic Modelling System 
(GAMS).  This version is almost identical to the one developed by Hertel except that it introduces a few 
modifications, which include replacing the Committee for Economic Development (CED) hypothesis 
for the function of the final consumption with a simple Cobb-Douglass function.  Nonetheless, we have 
opted for a CES function.13
5.1	 Production
The producers of a given sector in a given country make a product intended for the domestic and the 
foreign market.  This production assumes that there are no returns to scale.  Production is carried out 
based on five production factors (skilled and unskilled workers, capital, land and natural resources), as 
well as intermediate consumption.  The level of the intermediate consumption involved is assumed to be 
proportional to the level of production.  In line with Armington’s (1969) formulation, the intermediate 
consumption is an aggregate of domestic and imported varieties.  The producers thus minimize costs 
linked to the production factors using Leontief ’s production function between intermediate consumption 
and value-added inputs. This is assumed to be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between the 
different production factors. The different markets are assumed to be in pure and perfect competition.
5.2	 The	final	demand
The standard GTAP version distinguishes between government demand and private demand.  We 
have ignored this hypothesis and we assume that the final demand comes from one single regional 
representative agent.  It collects all the revenue generated in the economy.  This revenue is distributed 
between the final demand and savings.  In line with the GTAP model, we assume that a fixed amount of 
the revenue is allocated to savings.  The regional agent maximizes its welfare function by distinguishing 
12  The full description of the model can be found in Hertel (1997).
13  In this study we have used the GTAP 5.4 version. Version 6 of the database is not available at the time of writing this study but would be 
better suited to support the impact of our scenarios on the African economies.
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between domestic and foreign goods in line with Armington’s (1969) hypothesis for the same sector and 
distributes the consumption between the sectors according to a CES function.
5.3	 Bilateral	trade
In each region there are two types of demand for imported goods: the final good and the intermediate 
good.14  The import aggregate is thus the sum of the two components.  This aggregate is a CES function 
of the imports from all partner countries.  Bilateral trade is thus subject to two types of tax (export tax 
and customs duty), and a transport cost.  The transport cost is assumed to be proportional to the volume 
of trade.  The transport sector is assumed to be a service sector that is set up in perfect competition by 
the producers of all the regions, with an Armington specification and a constant elasticity of substitution. 
The level of imports of a given product from a given country in a given region is thus determined by 
minimizing import costs given the free on board (FOB) prices. 
5.4	 The	aggregate	adopted
We present the geographical and sectoral aggregate in the annexes.
14  In GTAP there are three, including the public good.

VI. THE SCENARIOS ADOPTED
This section aims to develop various liberalization scenarios and to analyse their potential impact on 
Africa, using the model presented in the previous section.  Using those scenarios, the potential effects 
of different results of the agriculture negotiations on African economies will be tested.  The simulations 
will, of course, take into account the negotiations in terms of border measures (tariffs and quotas) and 
also the reforms negotiated under the WTO on the other two pillars, which are domestic measures and 
export subsidies. Because of their impact on international prices, domestic measures and export subsidies 
can affect the market access conditions for African countries.
6.1	 The	African	position	and	the	Kigali	Consensus
Member countries of the African Union (AU) have voiced their opinion on multilateral trade negotiations 
by means of the “Kigali Consensus on the post-Cancun Doha work programme”, which was adopted in 
Kigali, Rwanda on 28 May 2004. Rather than setting target reduction figures or putting forward tariff-
reduction formulas, the AU countries emphasize their “anxiety and concern” with the use of Derbez’s 
mixed formula.  The Kigali declaration stresses that “any tariff-reduction formula should fully take into 
account the needs and concerns of the African countries relating to development”.  Nevertheless, the Kigali 
Consensus provides some markers for the negotiations and these include the following objectives:
• Greater consideration of the importance of preferential access to the markets for developing 
countries;
• Greater market access for the agricultural products of the African countries, including processed 
products (reduction of tariff escalation and peaks);
• Special products to be unilaterally selected by the African countries as well as the establishment for 
the developing countries of a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) whose use and duration would 
need to be negotiated;
• The domestic support provided by the developed countries to their producers should be substantially 
reduced;
• The elimination of support measures for export competition;
• LDCs should be exempt from all reductions;
• There is a consensus that the developed countries’ subsidies for cotton production and exports should 
be eliminated;
• There should be a detailed examination of the non-tariff obstacles that are severely impeding the 
market access of the agricultural products of African countries, including the obstacles associated 
with sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT).
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6.2						The	framework	established	by	the	July	Agreement
Following the launch of the Doha Round, the WTO member countries have recently reached an agreement 
on a text that establishes the broad outline of a framework in which negotiations should take place as of 
September 2004.  The “July package” is not very clear on agricultural issues, particularly in comparison 
with the detailed text on negotiations for non-agricultural products. Annex A of the text of the “July 
package” framework agreement shows some progress in the negotiations on the three pillars, which are 
domestic support, export competition and market access.15  The most notable aspects of this agreement 
for African countries include the eventual elimination of all export subsidies, greater market access under 
provisions that are still to be negotiated, a decrease in domestic support measures, the establishment of 
particular safeguards for developing countries and an exemption on reductions for LDCs.16
First	pillar:	domestic	support
The text calls for substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. A harmonizing approach 
that uses a tiered formula will be negotiated.  The maximum level of support in the blue category will be 
capped. Reductions will take place using bound rates.  The aggregate level of domestic support will be 
reduced by 20 per cent following the first year of implementation.  To a certain extent all products will be 
affected by this reduction in domestic support.  Developing countries will benefit from S&D treatment 
by means of less ambitious support reducing targets phased over a longer period.  The Doha Declaration 
proposes “substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support”.  Developing countries will benefit 
from the S&D treatment by means of less ambitious targets for reducing support measures and a longer 
implementation period. 
In these scenarios, the authors propose to reduce domestic support by 50 per cent.
Second	pillar:	export	subsidies
The Doha Declaration advocates “reduction of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies”. 
As a result of the negotiations, the members agree to establish detailed conditions for phasing out all forms 
of export subsidies and disciplines relating to all export measures that have a similar effect by a feasible 
deadline (export credits, insurance guarantees).  The proposal here is to phase out export subsidies.
15  While the text recognizes the importance of cotton to the economic development of certain African countries, it refers these trade issues to 
the agriculture negotiations (Annex A). This is contrary to the demand of the African countries, which had called for the establishment of 
special conditions to deal with this sector.
16  For a preliminary evaluation and overview of the agreement, see: Agritrade news update: “the July 31st 2004 WTO Agreements on 
Agriculture: a critical review”(www.agricta.org); ICTSD, “Agriculture: ‘remarkable turn-around’ from Cancun”. (www.ictsd.org.weekly/04-
08-03/story2.htm).  

Third	pillar:	market	access
The July Agreement does not establish any kind of formula. It only makes the following provision: “To 
ensure that a single approach for developed and developing country Members meets all the objectives of 
the Doha mandate, tariff reductions will be made through a tiered formula that takes into account their 
different tariff structures”.  The LDCs would be exempt from all tariff reduction commitments.  The 
tariff reductions would be made using bound rates, with deeper cuts in higher tariffs.  The number of 
groups, the thresholds for the definition of the groups, as well as the type of reduction methodology (use 
of a Swiss or Uruguay type formula), remain under negotiation. The text of the Agreement specifies that 
there should be “deeper cuts in higher tariffs, while the type of formula, the number of bands and their 
thresholds remain under negotiation”.
The Agreement envisages the existence of a category of “sensitive products” to which lesser reductions 
could be applied. While the exact conditions of S&D treatment remain to be established, the text does 
nonetheless allude to proportionality, which would allow developing countries to implement lesser tariff 
reduction over longer periods of time.17   For developing countries, the case is made for a number of 
“special products”, meeting the criteria of food security, secure livelihoods and rural development.  More 
flexible treatment could be given to such products under conditions that remain to be established.  The 
text alludes to an eventual limit on tariffs, though this principle remains to be negotiated.  For many 
African countries, the concept of “special product” is a means of self-defence against inexpensive imports 
and against import subsidies in particular. These “special products” would act as a hedge as those countries 
open- up considering the adverse impact that a more ambitious liberalization process could have on the 
vulnerability of their economies and their high dependence on agriculture.
All the scenarios to be tested are based on the Harbinson formula, which belongs to the category of tiered 
formulas and has elements for each pillar.  It puts forward linear reductions per tariff band that have a 
quite similar result to the Swiss formulas.  This formula also harmonizes tariff structures but is more 
flexible and readable than an “ordinary” Swiss formula because a simple adjustment of the bands can 
greatly change the results of the formula.
6.3	 The	various	scenarios	tested
Four scenarios have been tested in this study:
1.	 A	scenario	based	on	a	first	tiered	formula	(S1)
This scenario includes a linear formula for quota-free tariffs, reductions in export subsidies and domestic 
subsidies and S&D treatment for the developing countries.  The developed countries should apply a 
17  As already indicated, the LDCs will be exempt from all reduction commitments.
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linear formula that has reduction rates ranging from 40 to 60 per cent; they should reduce their export 
subsidies by 100 per cent and their domestic subsidies by 50 per cent. Developing countries will apply a 
linear formula with less significant tariff reduction, which will range from 25 to 40 per cent.
Table	3:	Reduction	coefficients	associated	with	limits
Initial base rate for developed 
countries
Reduction rate for 
developed countries
Initial base rate for 
developing countries
Reduction rate for 
developing countries
>0% a=60% >20 a=0%
[%-0%] a=0% [60%-20%] a=%
<% a=0%
[20%-60%] a=0%
<20% a=2%
2.		A	scenario	with	the	application	of	a	tiered	formula	that	also	includes	sensitive	products	(S2)	
This scenario follows the guidelines of the scenario above and also includes sensitive products. The 
maximum number of lines dealing with these products is set at 5 per cent. The choice of products and 
the lines to be excluded is arbitrary and the method adopted is as follows: the most highly taxed lines will 
probably not be affected by the tariff reductions.  For this reason, no tariff reduction has been applied to 
the 5 per cent of the lines for which the tariffs are the highest.  The bands are adjusted for mathematical 
reasons and those initially presented in the Harbinson formula make the tariff reduction formula non-
continuous.
Table	4:	Reduction	coefficients	associated	with	the	Harbinson	formula
Initial base rate for 
developed countries
Reduction rate for 
developed countries
Initial base rate for 
developing countries
Reduction rate for 
developing countries
>0% 6% >20 %
[%-0%] % [60%-20%] 0%
<% %
[20%-60%] %
<20% 0%
3.		A	cocktail	formula:	The	application	of	a	linear	formula	for	all	the	countries	with	an	adjustment	
coefficient	for	the	developed	countries	(S3)
This scenario tests a tiered formula that takes on board more fully the interests of the developing 
countries.  A linear formula would be applied to the developed countries and developing countries.  The 
only difference is that an adjustment coefficient ofϕ would be applied to the developed countries.  The 
reduction coefficients proposed in this formula would be less restrictive for the developing countries 
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and would lead to a significant reduction of the tariffs of both the developed and developing countries, 
though to less than proportional extents. The developed countries should also eliminate all forms of 
export subsidies and reduce their domestic support by 50 per cent. The developing countries, for their 
part, should reduce their export subsidies by 70 per cent and their domestic support by 20 per cent.
The tariff reduction formula proposed would be of the following type:
1 0(1 )t a t ϕ= − × ×
whereby t1 = the new applied tariff rate; t0 = the initial tariff; a= the tariff reduction coefficient; and ϕ
would be equal to 1 for the developing countries and ϕ  would be equal to ( )( )01
a
a a t− +
 for the 
developed countries.
4.	 A	cocktail	formula	that	takes	into	account	sensitive	and	special	products	(S4)
This scenario takes scenario 3 as the starting point and includes sensitive and special products.  The 
developing countries should also identify these special products (necessary to their development) that 
would be exempt from tariff reductions.  The number of lines exempt under the special products category 
would be set at 5 per cent. The developed countries should also eliminate all forms of export subsidies 
and reduce their domestic support by 50 per cent.  The developing countries, for their part, should 
reduce their export subsidies by 70 per cent and their domestic support by 20 per cent.
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Figure	1:		The	coktail	formula
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Table	5:	Designation	of	the	agriculture	scenarios
Designation Agriculture
 S Tiered Harbinson-type formula
2 S2 Tiered formula including sensitie products
 S Cocktail formula
 S Cocktail formula including sensitie and special products
2
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE SCENARIOS ON THE TARIFF 
STRUCTURES
On a global scale, the average rate of protection in agriculture may seem relatively low. However, a high 
level of heterogeneity becomes apparent when such protection is broken down by geographic area or by 
product. The protection also varies according to whether subsidies are taken into account or not. 
Table	6:	Global	protection	in	agriculture
Type of 
protection
15United States 16Canada 17European Union Japan
Tariffs
Subsidies
 Total
.
0.2
.
0.
6.
2.
2.6
0.
6.
6.
.2
2.
Source: Cline 2004
7.1				The	current	tariff	structure
7.1.1	 Average	initial	structure	by	product	and	tariff	peaks	in	sub-Saharan	Africa
By examining the level of protection facing agricultural exports from sub-Saharan Africa by product, 
it emerges that certain products are highly protected. Exports of cereals, meat, milk, rice, beverages, 
tobacco and sugar are subject to rates in excess of 30 per cent and sometimes more than 200 per cent.
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Table	7:		Tariffs	applied	to	sub-Saharan	exports	(as	%)
Sectors EU USA Developing Developed Row
 Rice . .2 .22 0.2 .6
2 Cereals .6 0.6 6.62 .02 .
. Other-cereals .0 2. 20. 2.2 2.
. Vegetables .6 .6 22. .6 6.
. Sugar .0 2. 2. .6 .
6. Oilseeds 0.66 .62 . 0.6 .22
. Milk 62. 0. 2.0 0.0 .6
. Fishing 2.26 0.6 6. 0.0 .
. Vegetable oil .0 .26 .2 6.6 .6
0. Meat 6.6 .6 2.6 2.6 6.6
. Mnfcs . .00 . 2. .006
2. Sces 0 0 0.00 0.022 0.
. Food 2.6 0.6 .2 .2 2.2
Source:  GTAP 5.4
Breaking down such protection by destination reveals that the European Union and the rest of the world, 
(which includes Japan) apply the highest tariffs to sub-Saharan Africa.  These countries protect their rice, 
sugar, meat (168 per cent for the rest of the world) and milk (63 per cent for the EU and 119 per cent for 
the rest of the world).  Milk is highly protected by all the developed countries, especially by the developed 
countries of the Cairns group.
7.1.2	 Average	initial	structure	by	product	and	tariff	peaks	for	North	Africa
The agricultural exports of North Africa are subject to a structure and levels of protection similar to those 
of sub-Saharan Africa. The exports of cereals, meat, milk, rice, beverages, tobacco and sugar are subject 
to very high rates that can reach 237 per cent.
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Table	8:		Tariffs	applied	to	North	African	exports	(in	%)
Sr. No. Sectors EU USA Cairns 
developing
Cairns 
developed
ROW
 . Rice 6.02 .0 . 0. .
 2. Cereals 2. .0 6. 26. 2.
 . Other cereals .22 2. . 2. 2.
 . Vegetables . .6 .002 . 2.66
 . Sugar 6.20 .6 . .6 60.6
 6. Oilseeds 0.06 .62 0.60 0. .2
 . Milk . . 6.2 .2 .0
 . Fishing .2 0 .2 0 6.0
 . Vegetable oil . .26 2. 6.6 .0
0. Meat 62.0 . 2.2 .6 26.62
. Mnfcs. . .66 .62 2.06 6.0
Source: GTAP 5.4
As in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the EU and the rest of the world (including Japan) apply the highest 
tariff peaks to North Africa.  In comparison with sub-Saharan Africa, these countries protect their rice 
and milk less in relation to North Africa and their cereals more (52 and 112 per cent respectively).  Sugar 
and meat (236 per cent for the rest of the world) are the most highly protected sectors.  This study now 
focuses on the impact of the liberalization scenarios on the tariff structure
7.2				Post	reform	tariff	structure
7.2.1			The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	the	tariff	structure	of	the	partners	of	sub-Saharan	Africa
The figures below show variously, each region protection growth rates relation to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Two general conclusions can be drawn.  The global protection rate drops considerably in the case of 
the cocktail formulas (S3 and S4).  What stands out about these scenarios is that they include S&D 
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treatment to the benefit of the African countries.   In the case of the scenarios with sensitive products (S2 
and S4), the drop in the protection rate is restricted. 
(a)	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	EU		protection
Clearly, these scenarios including the application of a Swiss “cocktail” formula (S3) reduce protection the 
most, especially in such highly protected sectors as rice, cereals, sugar, milk and meat.   The choice of an 
ambitious formula tends to accentuate the difference between the initial tariff rate and the final tariff rate 
as the initial tariff rate increases, and this means that the most significant reductions occur with the high 
tariff rates.   These scenarios thus have a stronger effect on high tariffs than on low.   As Figure 2 shows, 
these scenarios are very effective for addressing the tariff peaks faced by a number of African countries.
Figure	2:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	EU	in	relation	to	sub-
Saharan	Africa
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The third scenario provides yet the best access for all products. Consideration of the sensitive products (S2 
and S4) reduces the drop in protection.  However, this effect comes into play at far more disaggregated 
level, more particularly where the tariff lines peak.
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(b)	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	United	States	protection
Figure	3:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	USA	to	sub-Saharan	Africa
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
eciR
slaereC
slaerecrehtO
selbategeV
reguS
sdeesliO
kli
M
gnihsiF
liogeV
tae
M
scfn
M
secvS
dooF
%
n is ff ira
T
Initial Tariffs Harbinson Tiered+SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP
In this instance also, the scenario with an ambitious formula (S3) provides the best market access for sub-
Saharan exports.  However, this difference is only significant in the case of sugar and, to a lesser extent, 
milk.  This is partly due to the very high level of the initial tariffs.  In the case of the other sectors, the 
different scenarios improve market access in a similar way.
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(c)	The	 impact	of	 the	 scenarios	on	 the	protection	of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	and	 the	Cairns	
group
Figure	4:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	developed	countries	of	
the	Cairns	group	to	North	Africa
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The formula applying a linear function for all countries and allowing for an adjustment coefficient for 
the developed countries, most reduces protection by the partners of sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the 
scenarios including sensitive products have a lesser effect.  However, this effect is highly significant for 
the developed countries of the Cairns group in the case of milk. Overall, the differences between the 
scenarios are moderate in the case of the other sectors and the other countries.
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Figure	5:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	developing	countries	of	
the	Cairns	group	to	sub-Saharan	Africa
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Figure	6:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	rest	of	the	world	to	sub-
Saharan	Africa
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7.2.2	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	the	tariff	structure	of	North	Africa’s	partners
(a)	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	the	EU	protection
As in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the ambitious scenario (S3) reduces protection the most, especially 
in the most protected sectors of rice, cereals, sugar and meat.
Figure	7:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	EU	to	North	Africa	
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This scenario also provides the best market access.  The factoring of the sensitive products (S2 and S4) 
into the formulas can greatly attenuates the reduction effected by the formulas.
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(b)	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	United	States		protection
Figure	8:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	United	States		to	North	
Africa
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The scenario that includes the application of an ambitious formula provides the best market access in the 
case of the tariffs applied by the United States to North African exports, especially in the sectors where the 
initial level of protection is highest.  This type of formula makes for significant reductions in the sectors 
in which the tariff peaks are most prominent.
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(c)	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	the	protection	of	the	rest	of	the	world	and	the	Cairns	
group
Figure	9:		Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	developed	countries	of	
the	Cairns	group	in	North	Africa	
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The analysis of the effects of the various scenarios on the products shows that the tiered formula, which 
more fully takes on board the interests of the developing countries (S3), offers the greatest reduction 
of the tariff peaks applied by the developed countries of the Cairns group. On the other hand, the 
Harbinson and tiered formulas offer greater reductions when the tariffs are relatively low. This is due to 
the fact that the “cocktail” formula focuses more on the high tariffs, as can be seen both in the case of the 
developed countries (Figure 9) and the developing countries (Figure 10) of the Cairns group.
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Figure	10:	Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	developing	countries	of	
the	Cairns	group	to	North	Africa
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The diagram below illustrates this phenomenon even more clearly.  The tariffs applied by the rest of the 
world to non-African products are relatively higher than those applied by the other regions. As in the case 
of the other regions, the linear formula into which is factored an adjustment coefficient for the developed 
countries reduces the tariff structure more significantly.
Figure	11:	Evolution	of	the	tariff	structure	applied	by	the	rest	of	the	World	to	
North	Africa
0
50
100
150
200
250
eci
R
1
slaere
C
2
laerec_rehto
3
selbatege
V
4
ra gu
S
5
s deesli
O
6
kli
M
7
gnihsiF
8
g e
V
9
-
lio tae
M
01
scfn
M
11
%
ni
sffiraT
 Initial Tariffs Harbinson Tiered+SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP
2
For Africa as a whole, the least favourable scenarios are those that include categories of  “sensitive 
products”.18 These products are subject to less significant tariff reduction.
In conclusion, for both sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, the formula that includes the application 
of a linear formula for all countries with the application of an adjustment coefficient for the developed 
countries, provides greater market access when the tariffs are relatively high, whereas the Harbinson and 
tiered formulas have a greater effect on the lower tariffs. The reduction coefficients proposed in this ambi-
tious formula would be less restrictive for developing countries and would undoubtedly lead to greater 
reductions in the tariffs of developed and developing countries, albeit to less than proportional extents. 
In addition, the introduction of sensitive products into the formulas significantly reduces the market ac-
cess obtained by the formulas, particularly when applied at disaggregated levels of the tariff schedules.
The tariff implications of the Doha Round should be especially significant for such products as sugar, 
meat, rice and cereals and, to a lesser extent, livestock, fish and food products. All the scenarios confirm 
this argument as long as the sensitive products are not included in the formula. The inclusion of a large 
number of sensitive products can significantly reduce the scope of the agreement, especially in the case of 
the access of African exports to the markets of the developed countries. It must also be emphasized that 
the “cocktail” formula has a much greater impact on the high tariffs of the developed countries than the 
other formulas.
18  In the simulations, the level of sensitive products was set at 5 per cent.  In future, it could be interesting to study the results when using 
different percentages.
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VIII.  THE IMPACT OF THE SCENARIOS ON AFRICAN 
ECONOMIES:  LESSONS LEARNT
8.1	 The	effects	on	income	and	on	production	structures:	GDP	and	value	added
In the following analysis of the impact of the various scenarios on production structures, the focus is on 
the particular impact on the growth of real value added by sector and GDP.
8.1.1	 GDP	growth	in	Africa
The foregoing simulations show that the whole of Africa would experience considerable GDP growth. 
On average, North Africa’s GDP would increase by 1.4 per cent, whereas in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
growth rate would be less significant at between 0.4 and 0.5 per cent.  However, these growth rates are 
among the highest in comparison to other regions.  The ambitious scenario (applying for all countries 
a linear function into which is factored an adjustment coefficient for developed countries), which does 
not include sensitive products, would make for greater GDP growth.  Obviously, this scenario applied 
a “harmonizing” formula to the tariff scales of the developed countries so that the highest tariffs, or 
the peaks, became the most significantly reduced, whereas the tariffs of the developing countries were 
reduced to a lesser degree.
Figure	12:			Impact	of	the	different	scenarios	on	the	GDP	(variation	in	%)
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8.1.2	 	Real	value	added
The diagrams below show the growth of value added using the various liberalization scenarios. In the 
case of sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that ambitious scenarios using for all countries a linear formula 
into which is factored an adjustment coefficient for developed countries, would make for increased value 
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added in those sectors where the initial level of protection is highest hence the very large increase in the 
value added of products such as sugar, milk and meat. On the other hand, a tiered formula with the 
introduction of sensitive products would offer the least beneficial scenario to sub-Saharan Africa in terms 
of real value added.
The same pattern applies to North Africa, though more sectors would suffer a drop in the value added. 
As in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, however, the sectors that had the highest levels of initial protection 
would witness a very considerable increase in their value added with the application of ambitious tariff 
liberalization formulas.  With the application of an ambitious formula that does not include sensitive 
products, such sectors as meat, fish and milk stand to gain in value added.
It thus emerges that, in Africa, products that stand to gain the most in real value added attract the highest 
tariffs. In decreasing order, value added would increase in the following sectors:
• Meat
• Sugar
• Oil seeds; and
• Rice.
As observed in the previous section, these groups of products are currently among the most highly 
taxed.
Figure	13:	Evolution	in	the	value	added	in	sub-Saharan	Africa
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Figure	14:			Evolution	in	the	value	added	of	North	Africa
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8.2	 The	impact	of	liberalization	on	welfare
This section deals with the impact of the simulations on the welfare of African countries.
Figure	15:	Evolution	of	the	welfare	(equivalent	variation)
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Regardless of the formula used, market liberalization leads to an improvement in both welfare in North 
Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the improvement in welfare is greater in North Africa when 
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an ambitious tariff reduction formula is applied.  It emerges that the most ambitious scenario offers the 
best welfare gains for Africa as a continent. This is partly due to the fact that in this scenario there are 
greater increases in subsidies and this means that resource allocation is easier in the absence of market 
access restrictions (for example, imported inputs can become less expensive).
On a global level, the developed countries of the Cairns group benefit the most from an improvement 
in their welfare which stands to gain considerably with the application of an ambitious formula.  As can 
be seen in Figure 20, such growth is largely the result of a marked improvement in their terms of trade 
(+0.35 per cent with an ambitious formula).
The European Union would be the only region that would suffer a drop in welfare. This is partly explained 
by deterioration in the terms of trade but also an increase in the global prices of agricultural goods 
following liberalization. It should also be remembered that the liberalization scenarios also factor in the 
elimination of export subsidies that would lead to deterioration in consumer’s welfare. 
8.3	 The	impact	of	the	various	scenarios	on	trade
The following section looks at the potential impact of the various liberalization scenarios on trade.  First, 
the changes that could occur in the trade structure of African economies will be examined before looking 
at the terms of trade.
8.3.1	 The	impact	of	the	scenarios	on	imports	and	exports
In varying degrees, all the scenarios show an increase in exports and a decrease in imports in Africa 
as a whole for the sectors whose value added increases (milk and sugar for sub-Saharan Africa, cereals 
for North Africa).  On a continental level, there is a greater increase in the volume of exports with an 
ambitious scenario that includes a significant reduction in tariff peaks. This scenario should also be the 
most favourable in terms of export revenue.  A tiered formula excluding sensitive products is the second 
best scenario for exports in Africa as a whole.  Exports would increase less with the Harbinson formula 
than with an ambitious formula.  The increase in exports would be greatly reduced with the introduction 
of sensitive products. This shows the importance of reducing tariff peaks and opening up market access 
to allow African exporters to benefit more from international trade.
Once again, the increases in exports are greatest for those products that are subject to tariff peaks. On a 
continental level, the increase in the volume of exports should be greater for oil, meat, sugar, cereals, milk 
and rice with the application for all countries of a linear formula into which is factored an adjustment 
coefficient for developed countries. These sectors are subject to the highest tariff peaks. An ambitious 
formula would provide the greatest reduction of such peaks.
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Scenarios that include ambitious agricultural liberalization are the most favourable for major African 
exporters. A “cocktail” formula, with the application of a harmonizing formula for the tariffs of the 
developed countries, could lead to significant increases in exports for these countries. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of sensitive products could eliminate these increases and even lead to losses in terms of the 
volume of exports.  However, in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, several sectors would slightly 
suffer from ambitious liberalization. While the variation in the volume of their exports is positive in the 
case of an ambitious scenario, it is slightly less than in the case of a more modest liberalization scenario. 
For these countries, the best scenarios in terms of the variation in exports are those that include sensitive 
products, and this can easily be explained by the erosion of their tariff preferences in the case of a tariff 
overhaul.
Imports in most sectors would increase. Nevertheless, all the scenarios show a decrease for products that 
were initially the most highly protected in the markets of the OECD countries.  This is logical to the 
extent that the real value added of these products improves and their production increases along with 
national export capacities.  Once all things are equal for these products, the local production replaces 
the imports.  Another explanation for this drop in imports is the increase in commodity prices of which 
makes national products more competitive  than imports.
Figure	16	:		Evolution	of	sub-Saharan	imports
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Figure	17:	Evolution	of	North	African	imports
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Figure	18:	Evolution	of	sub-Saharan	exports
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Figure	19:	Evolution	of	North	African	exports
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Figure	20:	Evolution	of	the	terms	of	exchange
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We observe a significant worsening in North Africa’s terms of trade.  The elimination of export subsidies, 
which applies to the European Union in particular, affects the countries of North Africa as their imports 
from the European Union increase.  The price of imports increases markedly in relation to the growth of 
their exports.  To a lesser extent, this applies to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, 
both the developed and the developing countries of the Cairns group improve in their terms of trade. 
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The analysis of the results of the simulations for agricultural market liberalization reveals some significant 
results for the African countries in the current context of the multilateral trade negotiations.
First, it is quite clear that the elimination of the tariff peaks and an ambitious liberalization, obtained by 
means of the harmonizing formula, would have the most positive impact on Africa.  The countries with 
the most competitive agricultural structures could obtain significant economic benefits from this type 
of liberalization scenario.  Some countries could suffer from erosion in their tariff preferences and, in 
some cases, from opening up their own markets too quickly to international competition.   Nonetheless, 
the losses brought about by the erosion in preferences seem relatively minor in most cases, especially in 
the context of the significant gains that other countries can reap using the same scenarios of ambitious 
liberalization.  Finally, it seems advisable for countries whose national production may be challenged by 
a significant increase in imports to make use of the S&D treatment. Within the framework of the “July 
agreement”, these countries can make use of the “special products” category that has been established to 
promote rural development.

IX.  CONCLUSION
Examining the impact of the “July agreement” has shown the effect of agricultural market liberalization 
on African markets.  From the analysis of the various tiered formulas, it emerges that the degree of 
openness would be the most important criterion enabling Africa to benefit from liberalization far more 
specifically, it appears that differentiation between developed countries and developing countries would 
bring African countries the highest gains.  Furthermore, the cocktail formula involving the application 
to developed and developing countries of a linear formula including an adjustment coefficient of ϕ  for 
the developed countries, offers the best prospects for the continent.  In addition, the issue of the sensitive 
products must remain a central concern for African countries in the case of all the tiered formulas.  The 
study shows that the inclusion of sensitive products would restrict the gains of African countries by 
maintaining the tariff peaks.
What is more, African countries must be particularly vigilant on other subjects under negotiation, 
especially the question of trade facilitation and the development of non-tariff barriers that can limit their 
access to OECD market.
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ANNEXES: SECTORAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
AGGREGATES
Table	9:			Sectoral	aggregates
Rice pdr Paddy rice
pcr Processed rice
Cereals wht Wheat
gro Cereal grains nec
ocr Crops nec
Vegetables _f Vegetables, fruit, nuts
Sugar c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet
sgr Sugar
Oil seeds osd Oil seeds
Milk rmk Raw milk
mil Dairy products
Fish fsh Fishing
Veg. oil ol Vegetable oils and fats
Meat cmt Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse
omt Meat products nec
Mnfcs wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons
for Forestry
col Coal
oil Oil
gas Gas
omn Minerals nec
tex Textiles
wap Wearing apparel
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Mnfcs lea Leather products
lum Wood products
ppp Paper products, publishing
p_c Petroleum, coal products
crp Chemical,rubber,plastic prods
nmm Mineral products nec
i_s Ferrous metals
nfm Metals nec
fmp Metal products
mh Motor ehicles and parts
otn Transport equipment nec
ele Electronic equipment
ome Machinery and equipment nec
omf Manufactures nec
Sces ely Electricity
gdt Gas manufacture, distribution
wtr Water
cns Construction
trd Trade
otp Transport nec
wtp Sea transport
atp Air transport
cmn Communication
ofi Financial serices nec
isr Insurance
obs Business serices nec
ros Recreation and other serices
osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat
dwe Dwellings
Food pfb Plant-based fibers
ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses
oap Animal products nec
ofd Food products nec
b_t Beerages and tobacco products
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Table	10:			Geographical	aggregates
Code Code Description
SSA bwa Botswana
xsc Rest of South Afr C Union
mwi Malawi
moz Mozambique
tza Tanzania
zmb Zambia
zwe Zimbabwe
xsf Other Southern Africa
uga Uganda
xss Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa mar Morocco
xnf Rest of North Africa
EU2 aut Austria
bel Belgium
dnk Denmark
fin Finland
fra France
deu Germany
gbr United Kingdom
grc Greece
irl Ireland
ita Italy
lux Luxembourg
nld Netherlands
prt Portugal
esp Spain
swe Sweden
cze Czech Republic
hun Hungary
mlt Malta
pol Poland
sk Sloakia
sn Sloenia
est Estonia

Code Code Description
EU2 la Latia
ltu Lithuania
cyp Cyprus
USA usa United States
Cairns deeloping idn Indonesia
mys Malaysia
phl Philippines
tha Thailand
col Colombia
arg Argentina
bra Brazil
chl Chile
ury Uruguay
Cairns deeloped aus Australia
nzl New Zealand
can Canada
ROW chn China
hkg Hong Kong
jpn Japan
kor Korea
twn Taiwan
sgp Singapore
nm Vietnam
bgd Bangladesh
ind India
lka Sri Lanka
xsa Rest of South Asia
mex Mexico
xcm Central America, Caribbean
per Peru
en Venezuela
xap Rest of Andean Pact
xsm Rest of South America
che Switzerland
xef Rest of Eur Free Trade Area
6
Code Code Description
ROW alb Albania
bgr Bulgaria
hr Croatia
rom Romania
rus Russian Federation
xsu Rest of Former Soiet Union
tur Turkey
xme Rest of Middle East
xrw Rest of World
Table	11:		Impact	of	the	four	scenarios	on	the	main	macro-economic	variables
Welfare Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP US Million
Dollars
SSA ,2 ,0 6, 2,2
NAF 2, 26,2 22, 206,6
GDP As %
SSA 0, 0, 0, 0,
NAF , , , ,
Secoral trade balance  Sub-Saharan Africa
Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP US Million 
Dollars
Rice -6, -,2 -6,62 -2,26
Cereals -,6 -, -6, -,2
Other cereals 2, 0, , ,2
Vegetables 0, , 0,6 ,
Sugar , 2,2 0,0 6,26
Oil seeds 6, , 0, ,6
Milk ,06 , ,6 2,
Fish 0,22 ,2 2,0 22,6
Oil -66,2 -,26 -,2 -0,
Meat 2,2 22, 6,0 ,0
Food ,6 ,6 -, -6,2

Sectoral trade balance
North Africa
Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP US Million 
Dollars
Rice , 6, ,22 ,2
Cereals 0,6 -6,2 20, -,
Other cereals -2, -2, -,6 -2,6
Vegetables , 66,2 ,66 ,
Sugar -,6 -,2 -, -,6
Oil seeds -,6 -,2 -, -,
Milk 2, 6,6 -,2 6,
Fish ,6 , ,2 ,
Oil -, -,6 -6,6 -,
Meat -, -,2 , -6,
Food 2, 26,0 6,6 ,2
Value added Sub-Saharan Africa
Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP  As %
Rice 0, 0,0 0,2 0,
Cereals 0,6 0,62 0,6 0,6
Other cereals ,0 , 0,2 0,
Vegetables ,2 ,2 ,0 0,
Sugar 2, 2, 2, 20,
Oil seeds 2, 2, ,06 2,
Milk 2, ,0 ,0 ,2
Fish 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,
Veg. oil -2, -2, -,2 -2,6
Meat , ,6 ,62 ,
Food 0, 0,6 0, 0,2

Value added North Africa
Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP
Rice , , , , As %
Cereals 0, 0, 0,6 0,
Other cereals -,6 -, -,0 -,
Vegetables ,0  0, 0,2
Sugar -0,0 -0,0 -0,2 0,
Oil seeds -2, -2,0 -2,6 -2,
Milk , , 0, ,
Fish , , ,2 ,
Veg. oil -,2 -,6 - -,0
Milk 2, 2, 60,6 ,2
Food -, -,6 -2, -2,0
Terms of trade Harbinson Tiered + SP Cocktail Cocktail+SP As %
SSA -0, -0, -0, -0,
NAF -0, -0, -,0 -,02
EU2 -0,0 -0,0 -0,0 -0,0
USA -0, -0, -0, -0,
CairnsDg 0,2 0,2 0, 0,
CairnsDped 0,06 0,0 0, 0,2
ROW 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Sources: Simulations done using GTAP 5.4.
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